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Abstract 
The potential of property rate has been least tapped by decentralized governments in Ghana. This 
paper investigates the property rating system in Ghana through a case study of Offinso South 
Municipality (OSM). Questionnaires were used to gather empirical data from property owners in the 
municipality. The paper finds that there is inadequate property tax administration system and high 
public disdain for the property tax in OSM, with a significant association between compliance with 
the property tax and land use regulations in OSM. The paper suggests that the Offinso South 
Municipal Assembly (OSMA) should improve its land use planning system to facilitate voluntary 
compliance with the property tax. OSMA should also address accountability and transparency 
problems in the property tax system in order to increase public confidence in the tax regime. The 
OSMA should also improve on the property tax collection modes by computerising the billing and 
collection processes.   
Keywords: property rate, land use planning, public disdain, Offinso South Municipality, Ghana 
Introduction 
Decentralization is generally expected to promote greater transparency, accountability, probity, and 
efficiency in urban services provision. It is expected to incorporate local needs and conditions and 
national objectives in the planning and delivery of public services (Keith and McCluskey, 2004). 
Efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy concerns are the main drivers of decentralization (McCluskey 
and Bevc, 2007).  Local authorities that facilitate broad based participation in governance, are more 
responsive to local needs and more capable of appropriately addressing local challenges (Baldersheim 
et al., 1995). The autonomy provided by internally generated funds is of extreme importance to the 
well-being of decentralized governments (Livingstone and Charlton, 1998). This is essential for the 
success of any decentralization programme. Fiscal decentralization and local governance lead to the 
realization of improved economic efficiency and accountability in a country (Kelly, 2000). Fiscally a 
decentralized system has the potential of maximising efficiency (Okrah and Boamah, 2013). Fiscal 
autonomy for local governments however, depends on the efficacy of tax instruments at the disposal 
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of local bodies, the growth potential of non-tax revenues and principled inter-governmental transfers 
(Kapoor and Ghosh, 1992). An efficient tax system provides a predictable revenue stream, has a 
limited administrative burden and is fair (Bell, 1999). 
Property rate is the most common, dependable and sustainable source of revenue to local governments 
worldwide. It is one of the most lucrative sources of local government financing (Mou, 1996).  It is 
thus essential for the success of fiscal decentralization and the financing of local infrastructure and 
service delivery.  For instance, it is a key source of revenue for local authorities in most OECD 
countries (Hefferan and Boyd, 2010). Property taxes constitute 100% of local tax revenue in Australia 
and Ireland, 99% in the United Kingdom, 93% in Canada and 72% in the United States (Braid, 2005), 
and the tax forms more than 2% of developed countries GDP (Bahl, 2009).  
Despite the immense contribution of property tax in developed nations, its potential is generally 
under-exploited in developing countries (Lall and Deichmann, 2006). Property tax revenue constitutes 
less than 4% of all tax revenues in developing and transitional countries, and averages 0.42% and 
0.54% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of developing and transitional countries respectively 
(Kaiser, 2005; Bahl, 2009). There are low rates of property tax collections across a sample of 
municipal corporations in India (Rao and Ravindra, 2002). The tax accounts for less than 10% of local 
revenues in the Punjab province of Pakistan (Ellis, et al., 2007). It is about 80% of local government 
revenue in Thailand, but its potential is highly under-exploited (Varanyuwatana, 1999). Property 
taxation raises about 27% of local government tax revenue in 52 municipalities in Latin America (De 
Cesare, 2004). It forms about 22% of total recurrent revenues of local authorities, 1.3% of total 
government tax revenue, and 0.3% of GDP in Kenya (Kelly, 2000).  
Property rate has been employed by various governments of Ghana since the colonial era.  Several 
statutes have been passed for the regulation of property rating in Ghana. These include the Municipal 
Rating (Immovable Property Rate) Regulations (L.I. 212), 1959; the Local Government (Immovable 
Property Rate) Regulations (L.I. 40), 1960; the Local Government (Immovable Property Rate) 
Amendment Regulations (L.I. 348), 1964; the Municipal Rating (Immovable Property Rate) 
Amendment Regulations (L.I. 349), 1964; the Municipal Rating (Immovable Property Rate) 
Amendment Regulations (L.I. 650), 1970; the Immovable Property Rate Amendment Regulations 
(L.I. 1049), 1975; and the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993. In Ghana, section 94 of Act 462 
makes Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDA) the rating authorities in their areas 
of jurisdiction. The Act 462 has therefore assigned powers of determining, levying and collecting 
property rate to the MMDAs in the country. Section 95 (1) states that: 
A District Assembly (DA) shall make and levy sufficient rates to provide for that part of the total 
estimated expenditure to be incurred by it during the period in respect of which the rate is levied 
and which is to be met out of money raised by rates.  
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Despite this legal backing and the potential of property rates to raise revenue for local development 
and services delivery, the MMDAs have not been able to mobilize property rate effectively and 
efficiently. The result is that the MMDAs in Ghana rely on central government transfers such as the 
District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) as their main source of funds. Since property rates are 
levied only on fixed property in Ghana, it should be relatively easy for the MMDAs to mobilize 
property rates compared to market tolls. Also, the stock and quality of immovable properties continue 
to increase thereby continuously enhancing the revenue potential of property rates. It is therefore an 
irony that the MMDAs should leave such a huge and guaranteed revenue potential untapped and 
rather focus on the DACF. Discussion with rating officials shows that most properties have either not 
been valued or re-valued over a long period of time; local authorities are either unwilling or incapable 
of mobilizing property rates and tax payers are reluctant to pay.  
The contribution of property tax to government revenue is negligible in Ghana; it formed 0.21% of 
decentralized government’s revenue correspondingly in 1997 and 0.19% in 1999, and only 0.03% of 
the country’s’ GDP in 2010 (Kwakye, 2010; Government of Ghana, 2011). Property tax contributed 
10.8% of the total revenue of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) in 2004 and 7.6% in 2005 
(Adem and Kwateng, 2007). Data from the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority (KMA) show that 
property rate raised 5.6% of the KMA’s total revenue in 2006 (Obeng-Odoom, 2010). Available data 
from the Wa Municipal Assembly (WMA) suggest that the WMA was only able to mobilize 58.56% 
of its projected property rate revenue in 2004 and 88.51% in 2008. In the Offinso South Municipality 
(OSM) available data show that the contribution of property rate to local revenue was less than 9% 
over the 2005 to 2009 period. Also, the Offinso South Municipal Assembly (OSMA) was only able to 
realize 24.21%, 75.65% and 71.78% of its projected property rate revenue in 2005, 2006 and 2008 
respectively. Less than 40% of taxable properties in OSM are on OSMA’s tax roll. Both the coverage 
and collection ratios appear low in the OSM. 
Scope and methodology 
The paper investigates the property rate regime in OSM. It solicits the perceptions of property owners 
on the property rate system, and investigates residents’ willingness to pay and their expectations from 
property rate. The paper again examines any possible link between the planning regime and the level 
of compliance to property rate payments. Field data were gathered in the Offinso South Municipality 
through questionnaires. Eight neighbourhoods from the municipality were selected for data collection 
through random sampling. Random sampling was again employed to select fifteen non-exempt 
properties from each of the sampled neighbourhoods. Due to the poor numbering of properties in 
some of the selected neighbourhoods, in five neighbourhoods properties were renumbered to ease the 
data collection exercise. A total of 120 rateable properties were surveyed, and interviews held with 
owners of these properties, as the responsibility for paying property rates in OSM falls on the property 
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owner. Data were obtained from the respondents through questionnaires. The Municipal Budget 
Officer (MBO) and the Chief Revenue Superintendent (CRS) were also interviewed due to their 
knowledge and direct role in property rating. 
The study area  
The study area is the Offinso South Municipality (OSM), located 17 km North-West of Kumasi, the 
second city of Ghana, administrative capital of the Ashanti Region and seat of the Asante Kingdom. 
The municipality has a land area of 1,350km², a population of 138,676, and a population density of 
103 people/km² in 2000 (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 2005). Individual families own properties 
which are mainly not for sale due to tradition and inheritance is matrilineal. A family consists of both 
the living and the dead of the same maternal lineage. All family properties belong to the dead, the 
living and the unborn. This forms the basis of the general non-disposability of family properties in the 
OSM. The living are obliged to protect property for themselves, the dead and the unborn. The fear of 
ancestral retribution (nsamantoa) generally reinforces the non-disposability of family property 
(Boamah, 2012). 
Property rate and local governance 
Rising demand for municipal services and infrastructure requires the availability of a reliable and 
sustainable stream of income for decentralized governments. Urbanization and decentralization have 
created the need for local governments to improve local revenue mobilization in order to enhance 
local infrastructure and services provision (Ellis et al., 2007).  
The taxation of real estate property is the most progressive and assured way of raising stable, 
predictable and sufficient revenue stream for local authorities and facilitating fiscal decentralization 
(McCluskey et al, 2003). Property tax is also politically visible, and economically efficient (Qing and 
Guo, 2006; Monkam, 2011). It is neutral on its influence on tax payers' economic decisions and 
therefore constitutes an efficient means for local government units to mobilize revenue (Trasberg, 
2004), and one of the best local taxes owing to the immovability of the tax base (Bird and Slack, 
2002). The tax is well-suited for local governments to generate revenue for the financing of their 
infrastructure investments and the provision of municipal services (Keith, 1993; Kelly, 1998; Lall and 
Deichmann, 2006). Property tax is also least affected by short-term income and economic dynamics 
since properties exhibit long-term asset values appreciation.  
Taxation of property helps to reduce the dependence of decentralized governments on central 
government funding, and is an important means for realising fiscal empowerment of local 
governments (Mathur, et. al. 2009). Property tax possesses the potential to impact positively on the 
fiscal autonomy of local authorities (McCluskey and Bevc, 2007). The tax strikes a balance between 
economic efficiency and fairness and hence much more acceptable to the local electorates (Davis et 
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al, 2004). Property tax is an ideal tax for local governments in low-income countries since it serves as 
benefit levy, is progressive in its distribution of the tax burden, and has significant revenue-raising 
potential (Bahl, 2009). In addition, its ability to mobilize revenue for local authorities has immense 
potential as a tool for land and urban development policies (Kapoor and Ghosh, 1992). It is imposed 
for the purpose of mobilizing revenue for government, public purposes, infrastructure, municipal 
services, or land use planning (Needham, 2000). It is therefore an important component of local 
government finances in many nations. 
The property tax system in most developing countries has several challenges. This may be the 
consequence of poor tax administration and policy. For instance, in most African countries, central 
governments hesitate to transfer property tax policy and administrative authority to local governments 
and are uninterested in the promotion of property tax reform (Kelly, 2000). The limited buoyancy of 
property taxation in developing and transitional countries may arguably be due to an under-developed 
fiscal decentralization regime (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Property tax has been ineffective 
in low-income and transition countries partly because of legal exemptions, under-valuation, and low 
coverage ratios (Bahl, 2009). For example, the physical, financial and human resource capacity 
required for effective property taxation is a major challenge in east and southern African nations (Bird 
and Rodriguez, 1999; and Franzsen, 2002). The availability of professional valuers is central for the 
success of property rating.  Despite the central role of property assessment to the success of any 
property rating regime professional expertise are generally lacking in most developing countries. 
Property taxation in the Offinso South Municipality 
The results of the field survey are presented in this section, with discussion of issues such as 
compliance rates, the role of land use planning, respondents’ perceptions of rating officials, 
willingness to comply, and residents’ expectations. 
Compliance with property rating in OSM 
The compliance rate with property taxation appears low in OSM. Table 1 (Panel A) indicates that 
42.5% of the respondents did not pay property rates. A very high incidence of non-compliance will 
make the property tax less buoyant, (McCluskey et al, 2003). This appears to be the case in OSM. A 
non-compliance rate of 43% suggested by the data is extremely high. This has been complicated by 
the lack of enforcement against non-compliance partly because of political or bureaucratic 
interference, which undermines the efficiency of the tax collection system and enforcement against 
non-compliance (McCluskey et al, 2003; Lall and Deichmann, 2006). As one rating official said:  
There is extreme interference in the prosecution of defaulters. There is complete lack of 
commitment on the part of the administration to implement enforcement decisions.  
Large scale violations of property tax regulations as observed in OSM, however, make enforcement 
against non-compliance such as prosecution or seizures of property socially and politically imprudent. 
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For enforcement to be successful its associated social and political cost should be minimal; this 
requires that the degree of non-compliance should be reasonably low.  
         Table 1: Compliance with Property Taxation in OSM  
Panel A: Compliance to Property Rate Payment (%) 
Paid Property Rate Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Yes 69 57.5 57.5 
No 51 42.5 100 
Total 120 100  
Panel B: Demand Notice 
Received Demand 
Notice 
Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Yes 62 51.7 51.7 
No 58 48.3 100 
Total 120 100  
Panel C: Compliance to Demand Notice 
Honoured Notice Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Yes 47 75.8 75.8 
No 15 24.2 100 
Total 62 100  
        Source: Author’s Data, 2012 
Table 1 (Panel B) suggests that 51.7% of the respondents received a property rate demand notice from 
OSMA, indicating low coverage. Also, Panel C (Table 1) shows that 24.2% of the respondents who 
received a property-rate demand notice from OSMA did not honour it, suggesting a low collection 
rate. The data show that out of the 57.5% of the respondents who paid the property rate only 68.1% 
were on OSM’s valuation list and were thus issued a demand notice by the rating authority. The 
remaining 31.9% of the respondents either paid voluntarily or were prompted by OSMA’s mobile 
property rate collectors. The data show that low coverage and collection ratios are partly responsible 
for the low property rate yield in the OSM. 
Land use planning and property rating in OSM 
Act 465 establishes the MMDAs as the planning and rating authorities of their jurisdictions. OSMA is 
thus the rating and planning authority in OSM. The Act makes it mandatory to obtain a building 
permit for all development (new developments, extensions to existing properties and change of use). 
Public discontent with the planning system is high, leading to large scale violations of the land use 
regulations in OSM (Boamah et al., 2012; Boamah, 2013). The evidence in this paper suggests that 
the violations of land use regulations appear to be linked to compliance with property rating. Table 2 
indicates a statistically significant relationship between property rate payments and compliance with 
land use regulations in OSM (Chi-square 6.54, P-value 0.011).  The data indicate that the respondents 
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who applied for building permits for their properties are more likely to pay property rates (75.6% 
compared to 59.8% for all respondents) and those who did not apply for building permits are more 
likely not to obey property rating regulations (48.7% in relation to 40.2% for all respondents). The 
Table further shows a statistically significant association between issuance of demand notice and the 
planning status of the property (Chi-square 9.87, P-value 0.002). Owners of approved properties are 
most likely to be issued property rate demand notice from OSMA whilst owners of unapproved 
properties are most likely not to receive one. The property owners may not be held responsible for 
defaulting property tax if they have not been billed. OSMA is thus largely to be blamed for the low 
property rate yield in OSM.  
 Table 2: Permit Applications and Property Rating in OSM 
  Applied for Permit (%) Pearson Chi-square 
 Yes No Total  
Paid Property 
Rate 
Yes 75.6  51.3 59.8 6.54 
0.011** 
 
No 24.4  48.7  40.2 
Total 100 100 100 
Received 
Demand Notice 
Yes 77.9  45.5  55.9 9.87 
0.002** 
 
No 22.1  54.5  44.1 
Total 100 100 100 
 Source: Author’s Data, 2012, ** p-value. 
 
The significant association between the compliance rates for the property tax and the land use 
regulations may be due to general public disdain and lack of confidence in both the rating and 
planning systems in OSM. It is also possible that owners of unapproved properties may be afraid that 
by paying property tax they may be noticed and sanctioned for non-compliance with the land use 
regulations. This however, appears less likely since properties are very conspicuous and it does not 
require special effort to identify unauthorised properties. Also, enforcement against breach of land use 
regulations is virtually non-existent in OSM (Boamah, 2013). It appears that OSMA has not been able 
to capture the large number of unapproved properties in OSM on its valuation list, as evidenced by 
OSMA’s inability to issue property rate demand notice to the owners of such buildings. 
The relation between the planning system and property rating may be due to the degree of informality 
in the municipality. It is important to note however, that unapproved properties are generally of high 
quality and are located on approved residential areas and building lots. Land allocation is done by the 
Offinso Traditional Council (OTC) based on OSMA's approved land use plan. Developers are, 
however, expected to seek planning consent from the OSMA, but most developers ignore this after 
receiving land, leading to large numbers of unapproved properties in planned areas of OSM. Thus the 
significant positive correlation (Pearson 0.336, p-value 0.010) between the compliance rates for the 
land use and property tax regulations may be due to public disdain for both systems. 
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Perceptions of property tax payers about the attitudes of rating officials  
As shown in Table 3, there is also a statistically significant association between tax payers’ 
perceptions of rating officials and compliance (Chi-square 9.24, P-value 0.002). The respondents who 
have positive perceptions about the attitudes of rating officials are more likely to recommend 
compliance to other property owners (94.5% relative to 89.4% of all  respondents) whilst tax payers’ 
who hold negative perceptions about rating officials are more likely not to recommend compliance to 
other property owners (36.4% compared to 10.6% of all respondents). This shows that tax payers’ 
who are satisfied with the attitudes of the rating officials are likely to honour future property rate 
demands and also encourage other property owners to pay. Similarly, the respondents who are 
dissatisfied are more likely not to honour future property rate obligations and also discourage others 
from property rate payments. This kind of ripple effect may be partly responsible for the large scale 
non-compliance with property taxation in OSM.   
         Table 3: Perceptions on Official Attitudes and Recommendations 
 
 Perceptions on Official Attitude (%) 
Pearson Chi-
square 
 Positive Negative Total  
Recommend 
Payment 
Yes 94.5 63.6 89.4 9.24 
0.002** 
 
No 5.5  36.4  10.6 
Total 100 100 100 
         Source: Author’s Construct, 2012, ** p-value 
 
Public dislike for the imposition of property rate 
The data indicate that 58% of property owners agree with the imposition of property rate in OSMA 
and 42% disagree.  Although, the proportion of the respondents supporting the property tax is higher 
than those with contempt for it, the 42% of the property owners who objected to the imposition of the 
tax is relatively high, which may partly explain the lack of buoyancy of property rate revenue in 
OSM. About 61.7% of respondents who dislike the property rate cite the misuse of property rate 
revenue and the absence of basic infrastructure and services in OSM, giving little justification for the 
property rate. The remaining 38.3% of respondents disliking the property tax mentioned socio-cultural 
reasons such as indigenous land rights as the reason.   
        Table 4: Agreement with Property Taxation and Neighbourhood Development 
Awareness  Agree to Property Taxation (%) Pearson Chi-
square 
 Yes No Total  
Benefited from 
Property Rate 
Yes 83.3  16.7  100 8.23 
0.004** 
 
No 50.6  49.4  100 
Total 57.8 42.2 100 
         Source: Author’s Construct, 2012, ** p-value. 
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Table 4 shows a statistically significant relationship (Chi-square 8.2, P-value 0.004) between 
respondents' support for the property tax and its perceived benefits, as those who have benefited from 
property tax investments in their communities generally support its imposition (83.3% relative to 
57.8% for all respondents). Those who perceive that their neighbourhoods have not gained from the 
property tax are more likely to hold the tax in contempt (49.4% relative to 42.2% of respondents). 
Table 5 indicates that respondents who are unopposed to the property tax are more likely to pay 
(67.7% compared to 61.3% of all respondents), and those who oppose the property tax are more likely 
not to pay (47.8% relative to 38.7% of all respondents). The result indicates that public disdain for the 
property tax regime has had negative impact on the buoyancy of property tax revenue in OSM.  
          Table 5: Agreement with Property Taxation and Compliance 
Awareness 
 Agree to Property Taxation (%) Pearson Chi-
square  Yes No Total 
Paid Property 
Rate 
Yes 67.7 52.2 61.3 2.73 
0.098** 
 
No 32.3 47.8 38.7 
Total 100 100 100 
Honored 
Demand Notice 
Yes 85.3 67.9 77.4 2.67 
0.102** 
 
No 14.7 32.1 22.6 
Total 100 100 100 
         Source: Author’s Construct, 2012, ** p-value. 
 
Respondents expectations from the property tax 
The relatively high public disdain for the property tax in OSM may be due to unmet public 
expectations. Table 6 indicates that 25%, 10%, 27.5% and 8.3% of the respondents expect OSMA to 
invest property tax revenue in general infrastructure and service delivery, education, urban roads and 
utility provision.  
             Table 6: Respondents Expectations from Property Taxation 
Reason Frequency 
Percentag
e 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
General Infrastructure and Service 
provision* 
30 25 25 
Education 12 10 35 
Urban Roads 33 27.5 62.5 
Utility 10 8.3 70.8 
Proper Waste Management 4 3.3 74.1 
Public Toilets 16 13.3 87.4 
Security 1 0.8 88.2 
Markets 2 1.7 89.9 
No Response 12 10 100 
Total 120 100  
             Source: Author’s Construct, 2012. * Respondents could select more than one option (e.g. education and utility). 
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Visible evidence in the municipality shows that facilities are generally inadequate. Educational 
infrastructure is limited and some schools have been maintained for forty years. Urban roads are 
lacking and some neighbourhoods are without access roads. Households’ access to piped water and 
electricity and is also limited in some neighbourhoods. Public disdain for the property tax and the 
limited buoyancy of property tax revenue may also due to these unsatisfied public expectations. 
Policy implications of the findings 
High non-compliance rates, lack of enforcement against compliance, general public disdain, and 
negative perceptions about rating officials all seem to have contributed to low property tax yield in 
OSM. The data indicate that the respondents who are dissatisfied with the municipal authority’s 
disbursement of the property tax revenue are less likely to pay the property tax and are even more 
likely to discourage others from paying. Due to the extended nature of the family system and strong 
socio-cultural relationships amongst property owners in OSM, the ripple effect of public contempt on 
voluntary compliance could be severe. It is thus important for OSMA to be transparent in the use of 
the property rate, making reasonable investments in urban infrastructure such as education and access 
roads which may have the potential to encourage voluntary compliance, as the field data suggest that a 
major constraint to the success of the property tax in OSM is the widespread perception that proceeds 
are misused and not invested in community services. Public confidence in the tax system is essential 
for the success of property taxation (Bahl, 2009). OSMA should purge the property tax of perceived 
corruption and negative official attitudes, which has the potential to encourage compliance, and 
reduce the social and political cost of enforcement.  
The field data also suggest a strong association between the planning system and property tax in 
OSM. Property owners who complied with the planning system or are satisfied with the planning 
system are more likely to comply voluntarily with the property tax. This link between the planning 
system and the property tax may be due to public contempt for both systems, or to socio-cultural 
factors perhaps because a property that is formal in one aspect is likely to be formal in others. Efforts 
at improving the land use planning system may thus yield dividends for the property tax system, so it 
may be important for OSMA to address the inherent problems in its land use planning regulations. We 
argue that developers who successfully secure building permits with few hurdles tend to have 
confidence in the municipal authority and subsequently comply with the authority’s property rate 
regulations. An improved land use planning system will also make it easier for OSMA track new 
developments and update its valuation list regularly. Improving the land use planning system will also 
reduce the degree of informal development; encourage compliance with the property tax; enhance the 
coverage and collection rates, and thus increase the yields to OSM. 
Comprehensive reforms of the property tax regime incorporating property data collection and 
valuation, tax assessment and collection, and enforcement against non-compliance are needed in 
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OSM, but administrative, regulatory, and technical shortfalls may undermine efficiency of the 
property-tax collection system and enforcement against non-compliance (Lall and Deichmann, 2006). 
Thus it may be appropriate for OSMA to employ GIS techniques and a tax-mapping system in 
property identification to capture all properties within its jurisdiction, both taxable and non-taxable, 
on the tax roll. A high coverage ratio is a prerequisite for successful mobilization of the property rate.  
However, OSMA has no qualified valuation professionals in-house though trained and certified 
valuers are not scarce in Ghana. What is needed is an efficient state institutional framework to utilize 
their expertise in ensuring efficient property-rate administration in the country. OSMA staff indicated 
that they lack legal powers to recruit rating officers directly, but have to get approval from the head of 
the Civil Service of Ghana or the Local Government Secretariat, and the municipality has not been 
successful in securing such an approval.  
The lack of qualified professionals to manage the property tax regime is a major obstacle to 
optimising property tax revenue in OSM. It is thus important for central government to remove the 
bureaucratic obstacles for decentralized governments in recruiting valuation professionals to enhance 
the property tax administration and maximize property rate revenue in the country. It is equally 
important for OSMA to strengthen the property tax administration system in the municipality. A weak 
system for administering property tax may lead to an inequitable distribution of the tax burden and 
surge public disdain against it (Monkam, 2011). An improved administration is essential for the 
buoyancy of property tax revenue (Kelly, 2000), and is vital to ensure that all properties within the 
authority's jurisdiction are captured on the tax roll, so that there is adequate valuation, accurate tax 
assessment, adequate collection and enforcement.  
Conclusion 
The study clearly shows that an inadequate property tax administration system, inadequate personnel, 
increased public contempt and perceived corruption have undermined the property tax system in 
OSM. Limited coverage of the tax base, inaccurate valuations, and inadequate enforcement and 
collection are partly responsible for poor collection rates, and it may be difficult for OSMA to justify 
the payment of the property rate without improving services and infrastructure in the municipality. It 
is recommended that OSMA strengthens the enforcement of property tax collections, expands the 
coverage ratio, regularly updates the valuation list, and computerises the billing and collection process 
in order to improve property rate mobilization in OSM. OSMA should also remove bottlenecks in its 
land use planning system since compliance with this is likely to translate to compliance with the 
property tax. OSMA should further ensure accountability and transparency in the property tax 
administration system in the municipality. 
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